U.S. DOMESTIC TERRORISM: Facing Homegrown Radicalization

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[swanson]

US moves on domestic jihadis

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/11/in_recent_months_the.php

By WES BRUERNovember 1, 2009 4:10 PM

In recent months, the US has experienced an alarming rise in jihadist activity. In the last two months alone, five terror plots have been foiled by the FBI, and there have been dozens of other arrests for various related crimes, such as providing material support for terrorists. The plots have been directed at targets at home and abroad, both civilian and military. The arrests clearly demonstrate the potential for al Qaeda and other extremist groups to recruit and carry out attacks in the US.

The extent of influence by al Qaeda and allied groups is evident in their ability to convince potential terrorists in other countries to come to the US with the intention of carrying out attacks; it is also shown by the capacity of these groups to indoctrinate US citizens and nationals. The case of Najibullah Zazi, the Afghan national accused of plotting attacks in the US, stands out in what has been described as the biggest plot against America since 9/11. Listed below are the incidents that have occurred so far in 2009.

Feb. 20, 2009: An Afghan national was arrested for his ties to terrorist groups and for trying to obtain a US passport by fraudulent means. Ahmadullah Sais Niazi was indicted on charges of perjury, naturalization fraud, misuse of a passport obtained fraudulently, and making false statements to authorities. After a 2004 trip to Pakistan, Niazi denied any association to terrorist organizations. One one occasion, Niazi reportedly met with Dr. Amin al-Haq, commander of the Black Guard, which is Osama bin Laden’s security unit. Authorities later discovered that Niazi had ties not only with the Taliban but also with al Qaeda and Hezb-i-Islami.

March 20, 2009: After at least 20 Minneapolis-based Somali-American men had traveled back to the war-torn county, only “several” have returned to the United States. The remaining men are reported to be currently fighting, or have been killed fighting, on behalf of the al Qaeda-linked, Somali-based terror group known as al-Shabaab. Counterterrorism officials do not believe the men have returned to conduct attacks on the US. During the investigation, Osama bin Laden urged Somalis to fight against the government and “the international crusade.” In April, federal agents raided money transfer businesses that served the Somali community, in an effort to halt the flow of money from the US to terror groups abroad. In July, authorities indicted three Somali-Americans for recruiting the 20 men to fight abroad, including one who carried out a suicide attack against the Somali government.

May 21, 2009: Four men were arrested shortly after planting inactive explosives outside two New York City synagogues. James Cromite, David Williams, Onta Williams, and Laguerre Payen are reported to have been “disappointed that the World Trade Center wasn’t still around to attack,” and often vowed to wage jihad. The men, three Americans and a Haitian, also plotted to shoot down a military plane with surface-to-air missiles. A confidential informant, whom the men thought belonged to the group Jaish-e-Mohammed, provided the men with the decoy explosives and missile that led to their arrest after an investigation of almost a year. The charges against the men include conspiring to use weapons of mass destruction within the US and conspiracy to acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles.

July 28, 2009: Daniel Boyd, an American, and six other North Carolina men were arrested for plotting terrorist attacks in Israel and Pakistan. They are believed to have taken a half dozen trips in which they intended to engage in violent jihad abroad; each attempt ended in failure. An eighth man, Jude Mohammed, a Raleigh resident whom investigators believe is a member of the North Carolina terror cell, was arrested for trying to illegally enter Pakistan’s tribal region and is believed to be still in Pakistan after he failed to make a courtroom appearance. Prosecutors played tapes in early August at Daniel Boyd’s trial that indicated his intent on engaging in jihad. "I love jihad. I love to stand there and fight for the sake of Allah," Boyd had said.

Sept. 14, 2009: The FBI, along with local law enforcement, raided several residences in Queens, New York City. The men had aroused suspicion by what authorities described as “espousing militant ideology” and had apparent ties to al Qaeda. No arrests were made at the time, but this raid was the first in what would become a string of arrests and foiled plots over the following two months.

Sept. 22, 2009: A federal judge ordered Najibullah Zazi to be held without bail. Zazi’s actions roused suspicion after law enforcement officials discovered bomb-making documents on his computer. After being interrogated by officials, Zazi admitted he had received weapons and explosives training in Pakistan. It was later discovered that his ties to al Qaeda went all the way to Mustafa Abu Yazid, the head of al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Two other men, including Zazi’s father and Ahmad Wais Afzali, were detained in connection with the case. The three are being prosecuted for lying to investigators about a conspiracy to detonate improvised explosives within the US.

Sept. 24, 2009: A 19-year-old Jordanian man was arrested after attempting to detonate what he thought was a car bomb, in the garage of a Dallas skyscraper. Hosam Maher Husein Smadi caught the attention of authorities after they discovered him on an extremist website. FBI agents say Smadi “stood out based on his vehement intention to actually conduct terror attacks.” Three undercover agents, posing as al Qaeda sleeper cell members, had been in communication with Smadi for several months during which they discussed potential targets within the US. The undercover agents provided the potential terrorist with an inert car bomb, which he parked under the skyscraper. Smadi pled not guilty to the charges of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction and bombing a public place on Oct. 26, 2009.

Sept. 24, 2009: An Illinois man, Michael Finton or Talib Islam, was arrested for attempting to detonate a car bomb at a federal courthouse in Springfield. Finton raised suspicion after letters were discovered by authorities that indicated his sympathy for al Qaeda and his intention to engage in jihad. Undercover agents posing as al Qaeda operatives befriended Finton back in February; he later discussed with them making specific attacks on the US. In August, Finton recorded a video, which he thought would be delivered to Osama bin Laden, that sought to justify the attacks on government targets. On Sept. 24, Finton, along with an undercover agent, parked the car that he believed contained nearly a ton of explosives in front of the federal building. With the undercover agent, Finton drove a few blocks away where he twice used a cell phone to remotely detonate the "bomb." He was immediately arrested and faces charges of attempted murder of federal employees and attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction.

Oct. 3, 2009: Two Chicago men were arrested for planning to carry out attacks on overseas targets. David Coleman Headley, a Pakistan-born US citizen who changed his name from Daood Gilani in 2006, was detained while attempting to board a flight to Philadelphia.The flight would have eventually taken him to Pakistan to meet with Ilyas Kashmiri, the operational leader of al Qaeda's Brigade 313. The other man arrested in the case was Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a Pakistani national from Canada. The two allegedly plotted to attack Jyllands-Posten, a Danish newspaper whose publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed caused outrage in the Muslim world. In January, Headley had traveled to Denmark to conduct reconnaissance on the building and commenced planning for an assault similar to the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Oct. 21, 2009: Tarek Mehanna was arrested in Boston for conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and has been indicted for plotting terrorist attacks at home and abroad. Mehanna, along with Ahmad Abousamra, plotted to kill US civilians, soldiers serving in Iraq, and two members of the US executive branch. Abousamra traveled to Pakistan twice, and both men later traveled to Yemen, with the intent of joining a terrorist training camp. In each instance the men were turned down for their inexperience. Upon returning home, the men then began to plan attacks in the US that included using automatic weapons on civilians in shopping malls. Mehanna had previously been arrested last year for lying to authorities when questioned about Daniel Maldonado, who pled guilty to undergoing terrorist training in Somalia.

Oct. 28, 2009: Patrick Nayyar, an Indian national living illegally in Queens, and Stanisclaus Mulholland were indicted on four counts of attempting to provide material support to Hezbollah. Since June, the pair had agreed to provide the Lebanese-based terror group with weapons, ammunition, vehicles, bulletproof vests, and night vision goggles. A confidential informant posing as a Hezbollah operative, working for the FBI, had met Nayyar and Mulholland on several occasions to discuss how the items could be delivered to support the group. Although Nayyar has been taken into custody, Mulholland has yet to be arrested. Prosecutors believe that Mulholland is currently in Britain.

Oct. 28, 2009: Luqman Ameen Abdullah, the leader of a mosque who also headed the Islamic movement in Detroit called the Ummah, was killed after opening fire on FBI agents. The agents raided two locations and apprehended 10 other men on connection with the case. Three men, including Abdullah’s son Mujahid Carswell, were on the run following the raids. Carswell was apprehended the next day, but the two other men remain on the loose. The Ummah, or "Brotherhood," is a movement with the goal of establishing a separate state within the US, governed by sharia law and whose national leader is currently serving a life sentence for the murder of two police officers in Georgia. The Ummah is said to preach violence against the US, and its members receive weapons training.

[swanson]

FBI 'murdered' radical Detroit imam, according to AP

http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/11/fbi_murdered_radical_detroit_i.php

By BILL ROGGIONovember 1, 2009 9:19 AM

Luqman Ameen Abdullah. Photo from the Council on American-Islamic Relations and Fox News.

According to the Associated Press, the FBI "murdered" Luqman Ameen Abdullah, the leader of a mosque in Detroit and a radical sect called Ummah during a raid on a warehouse. On Oct. 30 The Associated Press published an article, titled Murdered Imam's Followers Deny FBI Radical Claims. And lest this be considered a case of bad headline writing, the claim is repeated in the first sentence of the article:

A mosque on Friday dismissed as "utterly preposterous" the FBI's allegations that its murdered leader was part of a radical Islamic group.
The good news is that an alliance of Muslim groups, including the notorious jihad-friendly Council on American-Islamic Relations, is calling for an investigation into the "murder":

In Washington, a group called the American Muslim Taskforce on Civil Rights and Elections called for an independent investigation of Abdullah's death.
The group is an umbrella organization whose members include the American Muslim Alliance, American Muslims for Palestine and Council on American-Islamic Relations.

[swanson]

Older article of value...

swanson



Facing Homegrown Radicalization

http://thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=11570&pageid=37&pagename=Page+One

Myriam Benraad   September 7th 2009
Washington Institute

Last month, Kamal Hassan, a Somali-American living in Minnesota, pled guilty to training and fighting with al-Shabab, an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group in Somalia. In July, two other Somali-Americans in Minnesota pled guilty to similar charges, with the FBI continuing to investigate more than a dozen others who may have traveled from the United States to Somalia.

The FBI also recently arrested seven individuals in North Carolina on terrorism-related charges, including one who had spent time in Afghan training camps.

These and other recent events have raised new concerns in the United States about the threat of homegrown radicalization. As U.S. attorney general Eric Holder acknowledged in a July speech, the "whole notion of radicalization is something that did not loom as large a few months ago...as it does now." While the U.S. government has focused primarily on Europe as a source of potential terrorists, Washington should also look to the continent as a model in confronting homegrown radicalization.

A Troubling Phenomenon

During his first major speech in July, White House counterterrorism advisor John Brennan provided an overview of the current administration's approach to protecting American citizens from violent extremism and terrorism. Although Brennan emphasized President Barack Obama's new partnership with Muslim communities and the administration's commitment to defeating al-Qaeda's capacities overseas, little was said about homegrown Islamist radicalization.

This fundamental issue has long been downplayed by U.S. federal authorities and counterterrorism experts, who believe that Muslims and Arabs are generally better integrated into U.S. society -- as opposed to their counterparts in European society -- and are thus less vulnerable to the al-Qaeda narrative.

Homegrown radicalization has now returned to the spotlight after the watershed Somali cases. Court hearings have revealed that Islamist leaders approached most of the Minneapolis recruits and urged them to attend clandestine meetings where they were persuaded to travel to Somalia and become part of the local armed insurgency. Most troublingly, however, is that a number of the Somali-Americans who joined al-Shabab suffer from identity and integration issues similar to those of radicalized youth in Europe. Until now, the United States had seemingly been immune from this particular phenomenon.

Building on Europe's Lessons

Although American policymakers have long worried that Islamists radicalized in Europe would attack the United States, Washington can learn valuable lessons from Europe in addressing the challenge of homegrown radicalization. Consider, for example, some of the measures undertaken in France. Although the internal dynamics nurturing radicalization in France and the United States differ significantly, comparable trends exist.

The impact of socioeconomic deprivation, political alienation, and identity issues as vehicles of radical narratives -- a factor that looms large in the Somali-American cases -- appears to be a common pattern. The malaise experienced by nonintegrated second- and third-generation immigrants, as well as the lack of educational and professional prospects for young people, has nurtured homegrown radicalization in France. While this phenomenon is far less widespread in the United States, the recent Somali cases indicate that it is occurring, at least to some extent.

France's law enforcement and intelligence efforts have been fairly far reaching and certainly go beyond what might be politically acceptable in the United States. French counterterrorism magistrates have frequently used their preventive detention powers to target individuals suspected of inciting violence, incarcerating some and deporting others. In 2004, for example, a wave of French prosecutions targeted radical imams and included the deportation of Chelali Benchellali, the Salafist imam of Venissieux's now famous mosque -- an act that would certainly have been more controversial in the United States.

France has also prosecuted a number of its citizens after they returned home from jihadist activities overseas -- a move the United States is now taking in the Somali cases as well. In May 2008, for instance, France condemned and jailed members of a Parisian network of jihadists recruited by young Salafi imam Farid Benyettou to fight in Iraq. Court hearings showed how Benyettou, a French citizen of Algerian background, managed to radicalize a group of men in 2003 through private readings of online Islamist propaganda and vehement anti-American rhetoric.

Following the massive riots of 2005 -- which witnessed the uprising of deprived multiethnic youth in French suburbs -- France has been forced to acknowledge the necessity of coupling its often harsh police methods with greater social dialogue and political engagement. After his election in 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy made ethnoreligious discrimination one of his top priorities. As such, he appointed Rachida Dati as the minister of justice, the first individual of North African/Muslim origin to access a top cabinet position.

In addition, France has undertaken efforts to better understand the ideological motivations of Islamists.

Monitoring and counterradicalization programs have been implemented in the French prison system, historically a crucible for radical ideology and recruitment. Interestingly, official sources indicate that many American homegrown Islamists have also been radicalized while incarcerated, including the members of the prison-formed Jamiyat al-Islam al-Sahih cell in California that was convicted in 2007 for its plans to attack not only synagogues but also the Israeli consulate in Los Angeles. Indeed, prisons provide an ideal place for radicalizing the young and disenchanted in search of a sense of belonging and importance.

Within the prison setting, Islam has the added appeal of addressing feelings of inequality and injustice. Fresh converts are protected by fellow inmates and accepted into a new world where the slate is wiped clean. Radicalization often occurs very quickly in this setting, and it is only recently that the Federal Bureau of Prisons has pushed for an increased and systematic monitoring of radical material in U.S. prisons. To their credit, however, U.S. authorities have lately engaged in enhanced cooperation with France regarding prison issues, such as the training of Muslim chaplains.

Information regarding Islamist radicalization in America currently remains limited, and recent developments should therefore serve as a clear warning.

Already, the Obama administration is favoring a new approach that shifts from exclusively military options to increased law enforcement and intelligence efforts. Much remains to be done, however, and while U.S. policies are still mainly focused on defeating al-Qaeda's narrative and capacities overseas, dealing with radicals at home might prove all the more critical. Since al-Qaeda is evolving into a "franchise" operation, homegrown recruits could become the most serious threat to the United States. The phenomenon has become all the more worrying in light of many recent attempts by U.S. extremists to link up with foreign Islamist movements and inscribe their struggle at a global level.

In addressing homegrown radicalization, the French experience could provide the Obama administration with policy inspiration. France, although not a parallel model -- especially since it is still addressing the pervasive discontent of poorly integrated Muslim populations -- has witnessed no terrorist attack since the 1990s. Its success in handling the grassroots Islamist phenomenon has resulted from effective interagency coordination and the establishment of specific legal provisions and structures charged with the antiterrorist struggle. Figuring out ways to replicate this in the United States, including the possibility of establishing separate counterterrorism courts, would be an important step forward.

Myriam Benraad is the Keston Family scholar for The Washington Institute's Project Fikra, focusing on radicalization and counterradicalization in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and the United States. This article is one adapted from Washington Institute.

[BerserkerPrime]

Great timing Swanson, just as B. Clinton offers to "help" bridge the gap between Islamists and the rest of the world.  Hhhmmm.
Let's see, they're surrigates have made, what 4 attempts to blow stuff up in 5 months here in the US (that we know of).  The are ramping up attempts and won't slow down until they pull one off. 

BP

[swanson]

Counterterrorism: Shifting from 'Who' to 'How'
November 4, 2009 | 1918 GMT

www.stratfor.com

By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton

In the 11th edition of the online magazine Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of Battle), which was released to jihadist Web sites last week, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leader Nasir al-Wahayshi wrote an article that called for jihadists to conduct simple attacks against a variety of targets. The targets included "any tyrant, intelligence den, prince" or "minister" (referring to the governments in the Muslim world like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen), and "any crusaders whenever you find one of them, like at the airports of the crusader Western countries that participate in the wars against Islam, or their living compounds, trains etc.," (an obvious reference to the United States and Europe and Westerners living in Muslim countries).

Al-Wahayshi, an ethnic Yemeni who spent time in Afghanistan serving as a lieutenant under Osama bin Laden, noted these simple attacks could be conducted with readily available weapons such as knives, clubs or small improvised explosive devices (IEDs). According to al-Wahayshi, jihadists "don't need to conduct a big effort or spend a lot of money to manufacture 10 grams of explosive material" and that they should not "waste a long time finding the materials, because you can find all these in your mother's kitchen, or readily at hand or in any city you are in."

That al-Wahayshi gave these instructions in an Internet magazine distributed via jihadist chat rooms, not in some secret meeting with his operational staff, demonstrates that they are clearly intended to reach grassroots jihadists -- and are not intended as some sort of internal guidance for AQAP members. In fact, al-Wahayshi was encouraging grassroots jihadists to "do what Abu al-Khair did" referring to AQAP member Abdullah Hassan Taleh al-Asiri, the Saudi suicide bomber who attempted to kill Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef with a small IED on Aug. 28.

The most concerning aspect of al-Wahayshi's statement is that it is largely true. Improvised explosive mixtures are in fact relatively easy to make from readily available chemicals -- if a person has the proper training -- and attacks using small IEDs or other readily attainable weapons such as knives or clubs (or firearms in the United States) are indeed quite simple to conduct.

As STRATFOR has noted for several years now, with al Qaeda's structure under continual attack and no regional al Qaeda franchise groups in the Western Hemisphere, the most pressing jihadist threat to the U.S. homeland at present stems from grassroots jihadists, not the al Qaeda core. This trend has been borne out by the large number of plots and arrests over the past several years, to include several so far in 2009. The grassroots have likewise proven to pose a critical threat to Europe (although it is important to note that the threat posed by grassroots operatives is more widespread, but normally involves smaller, less strategic attacks than those conducted by the al Qaeda core).

From a counterterrorism perspective, the problem posed by grassroots operatives is that unless they somehow self-identify by contacting a government informant or another person who reports them to authorities, attend a militant training camp, or conduct electronic correspondence with a person or organization under government scrutiny, they are very difficult to detect.

The threat posed by grassroots operatives, and the difficulty identifying them, highlight the need for counterterrorism programs to adopt a proactive, protective intelligence approach to the problem -- an approach that focuses on "the how" of militant attacks instead of just "the who."

The How

In the traditional, reactive approach to counterterrorism, where authorities respond to a crime scene after a terrorist attack to find and arrest the militants responsible for the attack, it is customary to focus on the who, or on the individual or group behind the attack. Indeed, in this approach, the only time much emphasis is placed on the how is either in an effort to identify a suspect when an unknown actor carried out the attack, or to prove that a particular suspect was responsible for the attack during a trial. Beyond these limited purposes, not much attention is paid to the how.

In large part, this focus on the who is a legacy of the fact that for many years, the primary philosophy of the U.S. government was to treat counterterrorism as a law-enforcement program, with a focus on prosecution rather than on disrupting plots.

Certainly, catching and prosecuting those who commit terrorist attacks is necessary, but from our perspective, preventing attacks is more important, and prevention requires a proactive approach. To pursue such a proactive approach to counterterrorism, the how becomes a critical question. By studying and understanding how attacks are conducted -- i.e., the exact steps and actions required for a successful attack -- authorities can establish systems to proactively identify early indicators that planning for an attack is under way. People involved in planning the attack can then be focused on, identified, and action can be taken prevent them from conducting the attack or attacks they are plotting. This means that focusing on the how can lead to previously unidentified suspects, e.g., those who do not self-identify.

"How was the attack conducted?" is the primary question addressed by protective intelligence, which is, at its core, a process for proactively identifying and assessing potential threats. Focusing on the how, then, requires protective intelligence practitioners to carefully study the tactics, tradecraft and behavior associated with militant actors involved in terrorist attacks. This allows them to search for and identify those behaviors before an attack takes place. Many of these behaviors are not by themselves criminal in nature; visiting a public building and observing security measures or standing on the street to watch the arrival of a VIP at their office are not illegal, but they can be indicators that an attack is being plotted. Such legal activities ultimately could be overt actions in furtherance of an illegal conspiracy to conduct the attack, but even where conspiracy cannot be proved, steps can still be taken to identify possible assailants and prevent a potential attack -- or at the very least, to mitigate the risk posed by the people involved.

Protective intelligence is based on the fact that successful attacks don't just happen out of the blue. Rather, terrorist attacks follow a discernable attack cycle. There are critical points during that cycle where a plot is most likely to be detected by an outside observer. Some of the points during the attack cycle when potential attackers are most vulnerable to detection are while surveillance is being conducted and weapons are being acquired. However, there are other, less obvious points where people on the lookout can spot preparations for an attack.

It is true that sometimes individuals do conduct ill-conceived, poorly executed attacks that involve shortcuts in the planning process. But this type of spur-of-the-moment attack is usually associated with mentally disturbed individuals and it is extremely rare for a militant actor to conduct a spontaneous terrorist attack without first following the steps of the attack cycle.

To really understand the how, protective intelligence practitioners cannot simply acknowledge that something like surveillance occurs. Rather, they must turn a powerful lens on steps like preoperational surveillance to gain an in-depth understanding of them. Dissecting an activity like preoperational surveillance requires not only examining subjects such as the demeanor demonstrated by those conducting surveillance prior to an attack and the specific methods and cover for action and status used. It also requires identifying particular times where surveillance is most likely and certain optimal vantage points (called perches in surveillance jargon) from where a surveillant is most likely to operate when seeking to surveil a specific facility or event. This type of complex understanding of surveillance can then be used to help focus human or technological countersurveillance efforts where they can be most effective.

Unfortunately, many counterterrorism investigators are so focused on the who that they do not focus on collecting this type of granular how information. When we have spoken with law enforcement officers responsible for investigating recent grassroots plots, they gave us blank stares in response to questions about how the suspects had conducted surveillance on the intended targets. They simply had not paid attention to this type of detail -- but this oversight is not really the investigators' fault. No one had ever explained to them why paying attention to, and recording, this type of detail was important. Moreover, it takes specific training and a practiced eye to observe and record these details without glossing over them. For example, it is quite useful if a protective intelligence officer has first conducted a lot of surveillance, because conducting surveillance allows one to understand what a surveillant must do and where he must be in order to effectively observe surveillance of a specific person or place.

Similarly, to truly understand the tradecraft required to build an IED and the specific steps a militant needs to complete to do so, it helps to go to an IED school where the investigator learns the tradecraft firsthand. Militant actors can and do change over time. New groups, causes and ideologies emerge, and specific militants can be killed, captured or retire. But the tactical steps a militant must complete to conduct a successful attack are constant. It doesn't matter if the person planning an attack is a radical environmentalist, a grassroots jihadist or a member of the al Qaeda core, for while these diverse actors will exhibit different levels of professionalism in regard to terrorist tradecraft, they still must follow essentially the same steps, accomplish the same tasks and operate in the same areas. Knowing this allows protective intelligence to guard against different levels of threats.

Of course, tactics can be changed and perfected and new tactics can be developed (often in response to changes in security and law enforcement operations). Additionally, new technologies can emerge (like cell phones and Google Earth) -- which can alter the way some of these activities are conducted, or reduce the time it takes to complete them. Studying the tradecraft and behaviors needed to execute evolving tactics, however, allows protective intelligence practitioners to respond to such changes and even alter how they operate in order to more effectively search for potential hostile activity.

Technology does not only aid those seeking to conduct attacks. There are a variety of new tools, such as Trapwire, a software system designed to work with camera systems to help detect patterns of preoperational surveillance, that can be focused on critical areas to help cut through the fog of noise and activity and draw attention to potential threats. These technological tools can help turn the tables on unknown plotters because they are designed to focus on the how. They will likely never replace human observation and experience, but they can serve as valuable aids to human perception.

Of course, protective intelligence does not have to be the sole responsibility of federal authorities specifically charged with counterterrorism. Corporate security managers and private security contractors should also apply these principles to protecting the people and facilities in their charge, as should local and state police agencies. In a world full of soft targets -- and limited resources to protect those targets from attack -- the more eyes looking for such activity the better. Even the general public has an important role to play in practicing situational awareness and spotting potential terrorist activity.

Keeping it Simple?

Al-Wahayshi is right that it is not difficult to construct improvised explosives from a wide range of household chemicals like peroxide and acetone or chlorine and brake fluid. He is also correct that some of those explosive mixtures can be concealed in objects ranging from electronic items to picture frames, or can be employed in forms ranging from hand grenades to suicide vests. Likewise, low-level attacks can also be conducted using knives, clubs and guns.

Furthermore, when grassroots jihadists plan and carry out attacks acting as lone wolves or in small compartmentalized cells without inadvertently betraying their mission by conspiring with people known to the authorities, they are not able to be detected by the who-focused systems, and it becomes far more difficult to discover and thwart these plots. This focus on the how absolutely does not mean that who-centered programs must be abandoned. Surveillance on known militants, their associates and communications should continue, efforts to identify people attending militant training camps or fighting in places like Afghanistan or Somalia must be increased, and people who conduct terrorist attacks should be identified and prosecuted.

However -- and this is an important however -- if an unknown militant is going to conduct even a simple attack against some of the targets al-Wahayshi suggests, such as an airport, train, or specific leader or media personality, complexity creeps into the picture, and the planning cycle must be followed if an attack is going to be successful. The prospective attacker must observe and quantify the target, construct a plan for the attack and then execute that plan. The demands of this process will force even an attacker previously unknown to the authorities into a position where he is vulnerable to discovery. If the attacker does this while there are people watching for such activity, he will likely be seen. But if he does this while there are no watchers, there is little chance that he will become a who until after the attack has been completed.